Legacy authentication blocked via CA
2 enabled policy/policies block legacy authentication.
Read-only baseline audit of identity, email security, endpoint, and licensing posture for the Contoso Ltd tenant. Findings below are grouped by category, with status, detail, and recommendation per check.
2 enabled policy/policies block legacy authentication.
5 Global Administrators.
recommendation Reduce to 2-4. Use PIM and lower-privilege roles for daily admin work.
2 excluded principal(s) found across broad CA policies.
1 policy/policies require MFA for all users on all cloud apps.
SSPR enablement scope is not directly exposed via Microsoft Graph; manual verification required.
recommendation Verify in Entra admin center: Protection > Password reset > Properties (Self service password reset enabled = All).
p=quarantine
recommendation Move to p=reject after monitoring rua aggregate reports for 30+ days.
No DMARC TXT record found.
recommendation Publish: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:[email protected]
SPF -all (hard fail).
SPF ~all (soft fail).
recommendation Tighten to -all once all sending sources are confirmed in the SPF record.
DKIM signing enabled on default selectors.
DKIM signing disabled.
recommendation Publish CNAMEs and enable: Set-DkimSigningConfig -Identity 'contoso.co.uk' -Enabled $true
Default remote domain blocks auto-forwarding and outbound spam policy AutoForwardingMode is Off.
Tenant-level mailbox auditing enabled (default since 2019).
All 2 shared mailbox(es) have sign-in disabled.
1 shared mailbox(es) carry licences: [email protected]
recommendation Shared mailboxes <50 GB do not require a licence. Reclaim unless archive or litigation hold requires Exchange Online Plan 2.
Microsoft 365 E5: 12 of 50 unassigned; Microsoft Entra ID P2: 8 of 50 unassigned; Microsoft Intune Plan 1: 3 of 25 unassigned
recommendation Reclaim or downsize unused licences at the next renewal cycle.
5 licensed user(s) with no sign-in in 90 days.
recommendation Review and reclaim licences. Disable accounts where the user has left.
4 compliance policy/policies deployed.
3 MAM policy/policies deployed (iOS: 2, Android: 1).
1 certificate(s) expire within 30 days: Backup Service / Backup-cert-2024 / expires 2026-05-25
recommendation Rotate before expiry. Both old and new certs can coexist on the registration during transition.
2 expired secret(s): Legacy Sync App / expires 2026-04-02; Old API Client / expires 2026-03-15
recommendation Rotate expired secrets immediately. Prefer migrating to certificate-based credentials where the host can hold a non-exportable private key.
2 app(s) hold high-privilege Graph permissions: Lifecycle Workflows: User.ReadWrite.All; Audit Bot: Directory.ReadWrite.All
recommendation Review whether each high-privilege permission is still required. Replace with narrower scopes or migrate to delegated flows where possible.
3 app(s) without owners: Backup Service, Legacy Sync App, Old API Client
recommendation Assign at least one owner per app registration so there is a clear human accountable for credential rotation and lifecycle.